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Moore’s Law Versus “Man’s” Law?
How Cybersecurity and Cyber Terror
Government Policies May Help or Hurt
Entrepreneurial Startups
David Groshoff*
“Creating malware is bad, but if you sell it to police, it
becomes okay. . . . We are not lawyers, we are hackers, and we
know that any kind of rules can, and will, be bypassed. It is our
job.” 1
—Raphael Vinot
INTRODUCTION
In 1965, Fairchild Semiconductor’s Gordon Moore (later
co-founder of Intel Corporation) indicated that “the number of
transistors capable of being placed on a chip or integrated circuit
quadruples every three years due to innovations and the march
of technology.”2 This phenomenon has become known as “Moore’s
Law,”3 with indications that Moore’s Law has become exponentially
faster in moving technology forward.4
The Internet as we know it today was essentially invented in
the 1970s, and the world wide web was invented in the 1990s.5
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Angeles. Ed.M., Harvard University; J.D., The Ohio State University; M.B.A., Northern
Kentucky University; B.A., Indiana University; former founding General Counsel of
DreamFund.com, an infrastructure software company founded by the 2007 National
Entrepreneur of the Year and three-time Inc. 500 CEO Kent Plunkett. I thank Kent
Plunkett, Yong Zhang, Peter Crosby, and Mi Tang for their assistance in understanding
cybersecurity from the entrepreneur’s perspective. The Article is meant to be gender-neutral,
and the non-gender-neutral language in the Article’s title was employed for alliteration.
1 Raphael Vinot, On Ethics in Information Technology, BOINGBOING (June 13, 2015,
5:00 AM), http://boingboing.net/2015/06/13/on-ethics-in-information-techn.html [http://per
ma.cc/ZD7G-WSP2].
2 Peter Harsha, IT Research and Development Funding, in CHASING MOORE’S LAW,
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 23 (William Aspray ed.,
2004); see also Steve Mosier, Telecommunications and Computers: A Tale of Convergence,
in CHASING MOORE’S LAW, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES,
supra, at 29, 37.
3 Mosier, supra note 2, at 37.
4 See Harsha, supra note 2, at 23; Mosier, supra note 2, at 37.
5 See Mosier, supra note 2, at 35–36.
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Moore’s Law likely applies to the Internet6 and web as well, for
good and bad, with the bad meaning that laws, rules, regulations,
and policy levers cannot keep up with a rapidly moving,
technology-driven economy, which has led to very recent and
well-publicized cybersecurity breaches that this Symposium and
this Article research and discuss.
Perhaps the most widely known cyberattack in the paradigm
existing during the past several years occurred at the former
Dayton-Hudson Corporation, now known as Target Corporation.7
In this cyber breach, called a “watershed moment” in Target’s
hometown newspaper by at least one expert,8 the hackers
captured customer data from payment cards via malware that
had unknowingly been installed in Target’s computer system
through a Target vendor. While the cybersecurity breach against
Target occurred in 2013, affected approximately 110 million
Target customers, and was the end-result of a so-called
“phishing scam” from a vendor,9 the case has already
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6 In 1995, the Federal Network Council officially defined the Internet as:
the global communication system that—(i) is logically linked together by a
globally unique address space based on the Internet Protocol (IP) or its
subsequent extensions/follow-ons; (ii) is able to support communications using
the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) suite or its
subsequent extensions/follow-ons, and/or other IP-compatible protocols; and
(iii) provides, uses or makes accessible, either publicly or privately, high level
services layered on the communications and related infrastructure described
herein.
Id. at 36 (citing Definition of “Internet,” NETWORKING & INFO. TECH. RES. & DEV. (NITRD)
PROGRAM (Oct. 24, 1995), http://www.itrd.gov/fnc/Internet_res.html [http://perma.cc/6L45Z9ET]).
7 See, e.g., Inside Target Corp., Days after 2013 Breach, KREBS ON SECURITY
(Sept. 21, 2015, 12:01 AM), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2015/09/inside-target-corp-daysafter-2013-breach/ [http://perma.cc/M7DD-SAS8] (indicating that Target has since hired
outside consultants). Target also has created a so-called “cyber-fusion center” to improve
security and sponsored a national cybersecurity forum. See Inside Target’s Cyber Fusion
Center, A BULLSEYE VIEW (July 21, 2015), https://corporate.target.com/article/2015/07/
cyber-fusion-center [http://perma.cc/5AUT-7XCL] (indicating that Target Corp. planned to
invest over $1 billion in cybersecurity in 2015).
8 Tom Web, Cyber–Security Expert: Target Case is ‘Watershed Moment,’
TWINCITIES.COM (Feb. 2, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.twincities.com/ci_25047596/cybersecurity-expert-target-case-is-watershed-moment [http://perma.cc/DB4W-8YZQ].
9 Dan Goodin, Epic Target Hack Reportedly Began with Malware-Based Phishing
E-mail: Attack Hit Contractor Two Months Before the Compromise of 40 Million Payment
Cards, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 12, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/02/
epictarget-hack-reportedly-began-with-malware-based-phishing-e-mail/ [http://perma.cc/7H35A7DQ]. Initially,
‘phishing’ campaigns typically involved an e-mail that appeared to be coming
from [an entity] convincing users they needed to change their passwords or
provide some piece of information . . . . A fake web page and users’ willingness
to fix the nonexistent problem led to account takeovers and fraudulent
transactions.
Phishing campaigns have evolved in recent years to incorporation
installation of malware as the second stage of the attack.
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been included in business school and management program
books.10
This cyber breach could cost Target several billion dollars,
and that is before private litigation costs.11 Target did maintain a
cybersecurity insurance policy that covered approximately $90
million, according to an S&P estimate in June 2015.12 Further,
the cyber breach caused Target executives to testify before
Congress and forced the company to face federal and state
investigations relative to how the cybersecurity breach occurred.
In response to a Secret Service official’s statement that what
occurred to Target was “highly technical and sophisticated,”
Target’s CEO, Greg Steinhafel, asserted that the statement
“show[ed] [that] it’s not just our operation. It would be hard for
any retailer to withstand this.”13
Despite government calls against Target in early 2014, later
that year, the federal government itself announced that its Office
of Personnel Management was hacked, potentially compromising
the personal data of approximately 4 to 20 million existing and
former federal employees.14 U.S. officials blamed this breach on
hackers from China, possibly constituting cyberespionage, as
“Chinese state-sponsored hackers are the leading suspects,” who
relied on a method of attack known as spear phishing.15
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VERIZON, 2015 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 12 (2015), http://www.verizon
enterprise.com/DBIR/2015/. In 2013, more than two-thirds of cyber-espionage
compromising incidents involved phishing. Id. Approximately five malware events occur
every second, which is after controls including intrusion prevention systems (“IPS”),
intrusion detection systems (“IDS”), firewalls, and spam filters have done their work. Id.
at 21.
10 See, e.g., ANGELO KINICKI & BRIAN K. WILLIAMS, MANAGEMENT: A PRACTICAL
INTRODUCTION 37–38 (7th ed. 2016).
11 See, e.g., Ashlee Kieler, Target to Face Class-Action Lawsuit from Banks over Data
Breach, CONSUMERIST (Sept. 16, 2015), http://consumerist.com/2015/09/16/target-to-faceclass-action-lawsuit-from-banks-over-data-breach/ [http://perma.cc/GCU3-RJD8].
12 See Sonali Basak, Worried About a Cyber-Apocalypse? AIG Wants to Sell You a
Policy, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (July 22, 2015, 2:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2015-07-22/worried-about-a-cyber-apocalypse-aig-wants-to-sell-you-a-policy
[http://perma.cc/D2DG-RZR6].
13 Monica Langley, Inside Target, CEO Gregg Steinhafel Struggles to Contain Giant
Cybertheft, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 18, 2014, 10:48 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142
4052702304703804579382941509180758.
14 See, e.g., Ellen Nakashima, Chinese Breach Data of 4 Million Federal Workers,
WASH. POST (June 4, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
chinese-hackers-breach-federal-governments-personnel-office/2015/06/04/889c0e52-0af7-1
1e5-95fd-d580f1c5d44e_story.html [http://perma.cc/LUN2-TXBP]; cf. infra note 44 (referring
to a twenty-million number).
15 Josh Chin, Cyber Sleuths Track Hacker to China’s Military, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 23,
2015, 5:00 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/cyber-sleuths-track-hacker-to-chinas-military1443042030. This assertion is not to suggest that the United States does not engage in
cyber surveillance internally or externally. See Charlie Savage et al., Hunting for
Hackers, N.S.A. Secretly Expands Internet Spying at Border, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/05/us/hunting-for-hackers-nsa-secretly-expands-internet-
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spying-at-us-border.html [http://perma.cc/4LQC-FZNL].
16 See, e.g., Laurie Segall, Pastor Outed on Ashley Madison Commits Suicide, CNN
MONEY (Sept. 8, 2015, 7:10 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/09/08/technology/ashleymadison-suicide/index.html [http://perma.cc/CVC4-5QAA]; see also Chris Isidore & David
Goldman, Ashley Madison Hackers Post Millions of Customer Names, CNN MONEY (Aug.
18, 2015, 12:39 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/08/18/technology/ashley-madison-datadump/index.html?iid=EL [http://perma.cc/2ZCZ-VAYM] (stating that a month prior to the
data release, the hackers, calling themselves the “Impact Team,” indicated they would
hack and release the information obtained unless the website ceased operations).
17 IRS Breach Bigger than Thought, CNBC (Aug. 17, 2015, 2:07 PM), http://video.
cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000407838.
18 Yang Jie & Josh Chin, Apple iOS Breach No Mere ‘Mistaken Experiment,’ Chinese
Experts Say, WALL ST. J.: CHINA REAL TIME (Sept. 21, 2015, 8:55 PM), http://blogs.wsj.
com/chinarealtime/2015/09/21/prank-or-hack-apple-china-breach-in-eye-of-beholder/.

37838-chp_19-2 Sheet No. 18 Side B

Very personal websites such as Ashley Madison—the
purpose of which was to assist adults in finding a partner with
whom to commit adultery—were hacked in 2015. This led to the
disclosure of details from 32 million accounts and the loss of
human capital, in addition to financial capital, as some customers
of that website committed suicide as a result of the data breach
of which Ashley Madison had been forewarned.16 The Internal
Revenue Service (“IRS”) admitted breaches to its system, leading
to the disruption of information of approximately 300,000 people.
Simply put, cybersecurity is not a public sector issue or a
private sector issue. The federal government should not be
putting businesses such as Target through costly investigations
while at the same time leaving the nation’s power grid vulnerable,
and exposing millions of people’s personal information—stored by
state-sponsored government entities such as UCLA’s medical
system and the IRS—to data breaches.17 Even software
technology companies have been hacked in the past year, as
Apple, Inc. became victim in mid-September 2015.18 To attempt
to combat the various forms of cyber-rattling that have been
occurring, a number of discussions have taken place offering a
variety of proposals, including this Symposium.
However, one hugely important sector of the U.S. economy
that appears to be ignored in all of this discussion is the plight of
risk management relative to cybersecurity for the entrepreneur.
For purposes of this Article, “entrepreneur” means a startup
enterprise or the founder of a startup entity for which the
end-goal is that the entity scale to the point of an initial public
offering (“IPO”) under U.S. securities regulations or an
acquisition of the business. This Article considers the risks and
costs and policy arguments relative to attempting to run
a lean—non-cybersecurity—startup,
while
simultaneously
attempting to disrupt industries and compete with existing rivals
in the public, private, and government sectors that have proven
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I. BACKGROUND ON CYBERSECURITY AND CYBER LAW
A.

Lack of Meaningful Historical Guidance
Given that the majority of examples of cyber-hacking
described in this Article’s introduction occurred after the
Chapman Law Review’s announcement of this Symposium, one
can reasonably understand how quickly the field of cybersecurity
is moving relative to other areas of law and policy. For example,
the initial federal statute concerning computer crimes occurred

37838-chp_19-2 Sheet No. 19 Side A

incapable of protecting themselves or their respective customer
bases, despite employing costly protective measures.
The Article first briefly provides an historical framework—
including contextualizing recent events—regarding cybersecurity.
Next, the Article discusses what options are available to
businesses, due to the many recent breaches and failures of
government to defend against cyber hacking and cyber terror,
and then bifurcates the options available to established
businesses and startup entrepreneurial businesses. Third, the
Article discusses existing material cyberlaws, regulations, and
executive orders, as well as laws proposed by President Obama in
early 2015. Fourth, the Article uses those existing and proposed
rules to examine the pros and cons of applying a public-private
partnership to combat cyberthreats versus employing a purely
market-based solution.
Finally, the Article argues, and underpins with policy
proscriptions, that due to the huge differences between
established businesses and entrepreneurial startups, their legal
responsibilities should be placed under the rubric of a sliding
scale of fiduciary duties of care relative to personally identifiable
information (“PII”) and cyberattack mitigation, based on a
business’s size, scale, and duration since formation. This Part
also proposes that each state mandate corporations, limited
liability companies, and other owner liability-shielded entities
require a risk management committee of its board of directors or
governing body. The Article concludes that, due to the many
moving parts that exist in this area, the private sector should
lead the way in cyber protection, including self-policing and
certifying. Solely foreign governmental attacks on domestic U.S.
private or governmental cyber-hacking entities require a federal
mandate on businesses, rather than cyber hackers, that impact
U.S. citizens, businesses, and financial capital.
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in 1984.19 Less than three years old, 2013’s Internet and Online
Law,20 a practice guide, already seems dated relative to its
awareness or discussion of the existing and looming
cybersecurity threat. Although that text contains a robust section
entitled “Privacy, Data Protection and Related Issues,”21 none of
the numerous statutes, regulations, rules, and common laws
mentioned in the text are able to prevent any material
cybersecurity matters or materially affect a business’
cybersecurity attempts.
Another text, Technology Innovation Law and Practice Cases
and Materials,22 while again providing robust discussion on other
areas of law and technology, is essentially silent on cybersecurity
and cybercrime.23 Subsequent cases have been largely ineffective
to prevent or deter cybercrime.24 Worse, during several cybercrimes
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19 Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–473, § 2102(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 2190 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. 1030 (2012)); see also United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 507
(2d Cir. 1991).
20 KENT D. STUCKEY, INTERNET AND ONLINE LAW (2013); cf. CLIFFORD ENNICO,
ADVISING EBUSINESSES §§ 11:1–11:15 (2011–2012 ed.) (stating essentially same).
21 See STUCKEY, supra note 20, §§ 5.01–5.03 (describing the many acts affecting
privacy rights online including: (a) the Mail Privacy Statute; (b) Electronic
Communications Privacy Act and Stored Communications Act; (c) the Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Computer Fraud and Abuse Act; (d) Federal Trade
Commission Act; (e) Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”); (f) USA Patriot
Act; (g) Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPPA”);
(h) Graham-Leach-Bliley Act; (i) Common Law Invasion of Privacy Torts; (j) Fair Credit
Reporting Act; (k) Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act; (k) State Laws and
Requirements Imposed on States by the Federal Government; (l) the Stored
Communications Provisions of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act; and
(m) general descriptions of consumer privacy, identity theft, and the “tension” between
public and “hyper-public” information).
22 THEODORE M. HAGELIN, TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION LAW AND PRACTICE CASES AND
MATERIALS (2011).
23 See id.
24 See, e.g., United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 859–60 (9th Cir. 2012)
(interpreting the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, and stating that
“[b]asing criminal liability on violations of private computer use policies can transform
whole categories of otherwise innocuous behavior into federal crimes simply because a
computer is involved”). But cf. United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 270–73 (5th Cir. 2010)
(stating that employees may exceed permissible use of employer data of customer
information); United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263–64 (11th Cir. 2010)
(holding that a government employee of the Social Security Administration exceeded
permissible access under the law when obtaining personally identifiable information
regarding romantic and former romantic interests of the government employee); People
v. Harris, 945 N.Y.S.2d 505, 511–13 (Crim. Ct. 2012) (using the Stored Communications
Act to quash a subpoena to obtain information regarding a Twitter account and worrying
that an overbroad interpretation of the Stored Communications Act would lead to
“litigation by hypothetical,” which “becomes particularly risky in the face of ever-evolving
and ever-more-complicated technology”). Regardless, the penalties against the wrongdoers
under this regulatory scheme do little to protect personally identifiable information,
consumers, and customers in any material way, and as this Article’s introduction
suggested, these cases, even when a violation may exist, appear to do little to dissuade
large-scale cybercrime.
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or related criminal cases, jurors have inappropriately used social
media in contravention of court orders or rules.25
Further, according to Verizon’s 2015 Data Breach
Investigations Report, the New York Times employed the term
“data breach” in 700 articles in the year 2014, up from fewer than
125 articles just one year earlier.26 Additionally, Verizon reported
that 2014 became the year that the data breach was of the
“cyber” variety.27 Moreover, these articles described nearly
80,000 cybersecurity incidents, with more than 2000 confirmed
breaches, affecting 700 million compromised records and costing
$400 million in financial losses in 2014.28 While the top three
affected industries in 2014 were the same as in previous years of
Verizon’s studies since 2008—Public, Information, and Financial
Services—Section C of this Part describes a broader set of
industries that have become increasingly relevant during 2015,29
because of (1) Moore’s Law, (2) Verizon’s conclusion that mobile
app problems were not a problem as of year-end 2014,30 and
(3) although “anything that leads to the discovery of an incident
is worthwhile . . . in most cases, context is key.”31
B.
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25 See, e.g., United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 298 (3d Cir. 2011); Commonwealth
v. Werner, 967 N.E.2d 159, 167–69 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012).
26 VERIZON, supra note 9, at 1.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 3.
30 Id. at 18–19 (stating that FireEye, Inc.—discussed infra note 89 and accompanying
text—indicated that under 0.03% of smartphones per week had malicious code infections
based on 1400 EnPublic Apps, and Kindsight Security Labs’ biannual report indicated a rate
of 0.68%); see also Motive Security Labs Malware Reports, ALCATEL LUCENT, www.alcatellucent.com/solutions/malware-reports [http://perma.cc/7B5M-NDFP].
31 VERIZON, supra note 9, at 11.
32 See supra notes 19, 24–25 and accompanying text.
33 Screen capture on file with author.
34 See, e.g., Andrei Hagiu, Work 3.0: Redefining Jobs and Companies in the Uber Age,
HARV. BUS. SCH. (Sept. 29, 2015), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/work-3-0-redefining-jobs-and-
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Paucity of Case Law and Academic Writing on the Matter
In conducting initial research for this Article in the late
Spring of 2015, I conducted a Lexis database search using the term
“cybersecurity” and located only ninety-five cases—underscoring
the current importance of the case law cited earlier32—and fewer
than two dozen relevant law journal articles.33 I believe it is safe
for me to assert at this time that technology and human action in
this arena are well ahead of meaningful protective legal and
policy instruments. For a current example—albeit in a slightly
different arena of business disruption—that illustrates technology
outpacing the extant legal regime, one need simply review Uber’s
and Lyft’s business models versus traditional taxi cabs.34
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C. Industry Examples of Real Consequences Beyond the
Consumer Phase
1. Recent Concurring Black Swan Events Across Industries
During 2015, society witnessed black swan cybersecurity
events, such as simultaneous cyber outages to major components
of U.S. industry. For example, first, on July 8, 2015, at
approximately 10:00 a.m., one of the nation’s largest airlines,
UAL/Continental grounded its flights due to cyber problems, with
the company’s former CEO describing UAL as “100% dependent
on IT.”35 Second, at approximately 11:32 a.m. on the same day,
the New York Stock Exchange’s (“NYSE’s”) computer
infrastructure failed, leading to the longest suspension of trading
(and the cancelling of all prior trades) since at least the so-called
“flash-crash” of 2009.36 Third, during this time on the same day,
the financial media websites of the Wall Street Journal and
ZeroHedge also failed.37
The confluence of these events led not only to spikes in the
share prices of cybersecurity firms once share trading resumed,38
but also to two Justice Department officials commenting on the
matter, President Obama being briefed on the issue and
subsequently issuing a statement, the involvement of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), and a statement from the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).39 Eerily, on the eve
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companies-in-the-uber-age [http://perma.cc/3YMX-5DHU].
35 UAL 100% Dependent on IT: Former Continental CEO, CNBC (July 8, 2015, 10:11
AM), http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000395071; United Flights Grounded Due to
Computer Issue, CNBC (July 8, 2015, 9:51 AM), http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000
395056.
36 UAL 100% Dependent on IT: Former Continental CEO, supra note 35; United
Flights Grounded Due to Computer Issue, supra note 35.
37 See, e.g., Tyler Durden, And Now the Wall Street Journal Is Down, ZEROHEDGE
(July 8, 2015, 11:50 AM), http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-07-08/wall-street-journaldown [http://perma.cc/3RU3-6XJB]; see also Kaja Whitehouse, WSJ, Barrons
Hacked: CEO Warns of Wider Plot, USA TODAY (Oct. 9, 2015, 5:06 PM), http://www.usa
today.com/story/money/2015/10/09/barrons-hacked-ceo-warns-wider-plot/73663568/
[http://perma.cc/3KJB-REWG] (indicating that the Wall Street Journal announced in
October 2015 that the business has been hacked multiple times since at least 2012).
38 See, e.g., FactorShares Trust PureFunds ISE Cyber Security ETF, MARKETWATCH
(July 8, 2015), http://www.marketwatch.com/investing/fund/HACK/historical?siteid=mktw
&date=July%208%2C%202015&userName=&password=&remChk=on&returnUrl=&persi
st=&x=15&y=12 [http://perma.cc/K4JM-VV46] (rising more than 1.7% for a basket of
cybersecurity stocks on more than double the average daily trading volume for the stock);
see also CyberArk Software Ltd., MARKETWATCH (July 8, 2015), http://www.market
watch.com/investing/stock/CYBR/historical?siteid=mktw&date=July%208%2C%202015&
userName=&password=&remChk=on&returnUrl=&persist=&x=0&y=0 [http://perma.cc/7
ASB-HKUT] (rising more than 8.8% in intra-day trading for cybersecurity firm CyberArk
discussed infra).
39 See, e.g., FBI: Monitoring Situation at NYSE, CNBC (July 8, 2015, 12:39 PM),
http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000395115; Homeland Security: No Nefarious Actor
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of this non-harmonic convergence, a mysterious tweet predicted
the occurrence of the highly improbable event of the NYSE’s
shutdown.40
However, a meaningful question remains as to how much of
a black swan event this instance in July 2015 was.41 Only a
month earlier, in June 2015, former FBI agent Austin Berglas—
who in 2009 created the New York branch of the FBI’s
cybercrime unit—described a hypothetical scenario in which the
NASDAQ market, the New York subway system, and Con Edison
(New York City’s largest gas and electric company) all
simultaneously went offline.42 Con Edison is part of the
public-private U.S. power grid, which, according to representatives
of the federal government, contains vulnerabilities that could
cost approximately $1 trillion to secure.43
2. Public Sector: U.S. Government, Cybersecurity, and
Cyberterrorism
Moving from the private to the public sector, as discussed
earlier in this Article, the U.S. government was subjected to a
material cybersecurity breach in late 2014. The size and scope of
this breach are still unknown, but it is believed to have affected
approximately 20 million people in the United States,44 and the
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in United and NYSE Issues, CNBC (July 8, 2015, 1:25 PM), http://video.cnbc.com/
gallery/?video=3000395165; No Indications United and NYSE Glitches Related, CNBC
(July 8, 2015, 12:02 PM), http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000395110; White House:
President Briefed on NYSE Halt, CNBC (July 8, 2015, 1:36 PM), http://video.cnbc.com/
gallery/?video=3000395167.
40 See, e.g., Jesse Byrnes, Anonymous Issued Cryptic Tweet on Eve of NYSE
Suspension, HILL (July 8, 2015, 1:55 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/247225anonymous-issued-cryptic-tweet-on-eve-of-nyse-suspension [http://perma.cc/6XXR-V4NJ].
For more information regarding the group known as “Anonymous,” see infra note 70.
41 See, e.g., Edward Helmore, The New Sage of Wall Street, GUARDIAN (Sept. 27,
2008, 7:01 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/books/2008/sep/28/businessandfinance.philo
sophy [http://perma.cc/4AMW-EHC5] (“[‘Black swan event’] refers to the medieval belief
that all swans were white, hence black swan was a metaphor for something that could not
exist, a metaphor that shifted into a perceived impossibility that came to pass when black
swans were discovered in the 17th century.”). See generally NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE
BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE (2010); Bill Conerly, Uncertainty
and Risk Management: What to Do About Black Swans?, FORBES (Feb. 20, 2013, 5:34 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/billconerly/2013/02/20/uncertainty-and-risk-management-whatto-do-about-black-swans/.
42 Basak, supra note12.
43 See Protecting US Power Grid from Hack Attack, CNBC (June 30, 2015, 8:43 AM),
http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000392902 (showing Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall,
Deputy Secretary of Energy, discussing federal attempts to protect the nation’s power
from cybersecurity threats); see also Ben DiPietro, Attack on U.S. Electrical Grid Could
Cost $1 Trillion, WALL ST. J. (July 8, 2015, 10:44 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/
2015/07/08/attack-on-u-s-electrical-grid-could-cost-1-trillion/.
44 See, e.g., Matt Spetalnick & Michael Martina, Obama Announces ‘Understanding’
with China’s Xi on Cyber Theft but Remains Wary, REUTERS (Sept. 26, 2015, 8:19 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/26/us-usa-china-idUSKCN0RO2HQ20150926
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IRS cybersecurity breach is apparently larger than first
thought,45 including the government workers mentioned earlier
in this Article. Further, when Chinese President Xi Jinping
visited the United States in September 2015, cybersecurity
threats—arguably cyberterrorism—became a meaningful topic of
discussion between Jinping and President Barack Obama.46
3. Technology Sector: Apps and Snapchat
Even the software industry can get hacked. In September
2015, Apple’s iOS app store was hacked by malware.47 A code
named XCodeGhost—rather than the intended-to-be-used-code
called
XCode—fooled
app
developers
into
injecting
malware-infected code into the apps they were creating.48 This
malware could steal users’ logins or send false prompts. Apple
did not indicate how many apps or users were affected by that
cyber breach.49 Many of the infected apps were located in the
China app store.50
Through 2014, Symantec has identified more than 1 million
apps “that are classified as malware,” 51 including
crypto-ransomware.52
Another technology company to suffer a cyberhack includes
the popular picture posting platform, Snapchat.53
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[http://perma.cc/K2SK-KF5S] (suggesting that government-to-government cyberspying
“could include the massive hack of the federal government’s personnel office this year that
compromised the data of more than 20 million people”); see also Jackie Northam, Obama
Meets with China’s President Amid ‘Enormous Strain’ Between Nations, NPR (Sept. 24,
2015, 7:35 AM) http://www.npr.org/2015/09/24/443053658/obama-meets-with-chinaspresident-amid-enormous-strain-between-nations [http://perma.cc/5KL2-NWLL] (“[T]his
two-day visit by President Xi Jinping comes during a particularly turbulent time in
U.S.-China relations.”).
45 See, e.g., IRS Breach Bigger than Thought, CNBC (Aug. 17, 2015, 2:07 PM),
http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000407838 (estimating over 330,000 taxpayers
having their PII breached from the IRS).
46 See, e.g., Spetalnick & Martina, supra note 44 (indicating, inter alia, the discussion
occurred amid “growing U.S. complaints about Chinese hacking of government and corporate
databases, and the suspicion in Washington that Beijing is sometimes behind it”).
47 Josh Chin, Malware Creeps into Apple Apps, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2015, at B1.
48 Hack Attack on Apple’s iOS App Store, CNBC (Sept. 21, 2015, 9:00 AM),
http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000422910.
49 Id.
50 Id. But see generally Anti-theft Protection for iOS (Apple) Wireless Handsets, CTIA,
http://www.ctia.org/your-wireless-life/consumer-tips/how-to-deter-smartphone-thefts-andprotect-your-data/anti-theft-protection-for-ios-apple-wireless-handsets [http://perma.cc/6H
MT-A5KU] (last updated June 2015) (representing, respectively, app and cyber protection
apps for mobile devices); KNOW MY APP, http://www.knowmyapp.org/ [http://perma.cc/
8H3C-7GHH].
51 SYMANTEC, INTERNET SECURITY THREAT REPORT 19 (Apr. 2015) https://www4.
symantec.com/mktginfo/whitepaper/ISTR/21347932_GA-internet-security-threat-reportvolume-20-2015-social_v2.pdf [http://perma.cc/6EXV-KEQE].
52 Id. at 25.
53 See, e.g., Byron Tau & Elizabeth Dwoskin, White House Proposes Consumer
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4. Non-profit and Medical Sector: UCLA Health
UCLA Health, a well-known health services provider that
has a number of famous celebrities among its client base due to
its geographic location, was breached in the summer of 2015,
impacting the PII and medical records of approximately 4.5
million patients.54 Reviewing cybersecurity in the medical sector,
from a legal perspective, some cyber-risk management firms,
such as Kroll, described later in Part II, have been able to work
with legal counsel to demonstrate to government attorneys that
the manner in which data had been saved by the hospital was
equivalent to encryption, so the state’s attorney general
recognized the matter as an exception to state law.55
Despite being highly regulated by government administrative
agencies, data breaches in the healthcare industry often involve
matters of life and death. For example, Gartner, Inc., a
technology-research company whose ticker symbol on the NYSE
is “IT” (i.e., “information technology”), indicated at the 2015
ITxpo that the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) recently
recommended the removal from commerce of an insulin pump
due to the potential of the pump being hackable in hospital
networks.56 Symantec indicated that in addition to insulin
pumps, pacemakers also are at risk.57
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Cybersecurity Measures, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 12, 2015, 2:08 PM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/white-house-to-propose-consumer-cybersecurity-measures-1421068868.
54 See, e.g., Chad Terhune, UCLA Health System Data Breach Affects 4.5 Million
Patients, L.A. TIMES (July 17, 2015, 5:51 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-uclamedical-data-20150717-story.html [http://perma.cc/RX69-XTVS]. For information regarding
the predictable class action lawsuit that followed, see Ortiz v. UCLA Health System,
No. BC589327 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cty. July 29, 2015).
55 Risk Analysis – University Medical Center, KROLL, http://www.kroll.com/en-us/
intelligence-center/case-studies/cyber-security/risk-analysis-university-medical-center
[http://perma.cc/23DC-BT57].
56 Tom Loftus, Cybersecurity Becomes Life or Death Issue as Companies Add Tech to
Consumer Devices, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 6, 2015, 8:08 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2015/10/06/
cybersecurity-becomes-life-or-death-issue-as-companies-add-tech-to-consumer-devices/.
57 SYMANTEC, supra note 51, at 29.
58 I acknowledge that this Section’s title could have referred to the “Internet of
Things,” rather than the automobile industry. The “Internet of Things” refers to
“embedded computing devices with Internet connectivity.” Id. at 26.
59 Abhirup Roy, Harman Says Car Hacking Risk Restricted to Fiat Chrysler,
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5. The Connected Car: Automobile Sector Cyber Hacking
Cybersecurity issues in the automotive industry can also
involve life-and-death situations.58 In July 2015, “two veteran
cybersecurity researchers . . . used a software vulnerability . . . to
break into a Jeep Cherokee being driven on the highway,
intensifying the debate about the safety of increasingly connected
cars and trucks.”59 The Jeep cyberhack affected air conditioning,
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windshield wipers, and “cut the transmission,” leading the car’s
accelerator to immediately stop functioning.60
And in August 2015, researchers at the University of California,
San Diego indicated that they successfully cyberhacked a 2013
Chevrolet Corvette.61 This breach apparently permitted the
researchers to send messages to the vehicle that not only
operated windshield wipers but also tampered with brakes while
the vehicle was driving.62 As a result, these cyberhacks in the
auto space evidence that the accelerators and brakes, among
other devices, in automobiles are vulnerable to cybercrime that
could have fatal consequences. A recent article posed the
question regarding cybersecurity and connected cars, inquiring
whether an industry-generated solution “without any
[g]overnmental approval is the right strategy.”63
6. Policy Tensions: Privacy Concerns Versus Cyberterrorism
Protection Efforts
Further questioning government-involved solutions is the
testimony in June 2015 of a FBI official before Congress
indicating that the FBI faced a challenge to “[work] with tech
companies ‘to build technological solutions to prevent encryption
above all else.’”64 Simply put, this means that the FBI wanted the
government to “make tech companies build in ways for law
enforcement to access secured content from their products.”65 The
FBI official, Michael B. Steinbach, assistant director of the FBI’s
Counterterrorism Division, also oddly disputed the “back door”
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REUTERS (Aug. 4, 2015, 4:32 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-fiat-chrysler-hackingharman-intl-ind-idUSKCN0Q91TV20150804 [http://perma.cc/7KAF-5TAF]; see also Andy
Greenberg, Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway—with Me in It, WIRED
(July 21, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway/
[http://perma.cc/ZA3D-ZEB3] (recounting the experience of being in a moving car that
gets remotely hacked).
60 Greenberg, supra note 59.
61 Andy Greenberg, Hackers Cut a Corvette’s Brakes via a Common Car Gadget,
WIRED (Aug. 11, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/08/hackers-cut-corvettesbrakes-via-common-car-gadget/ [http://perma.cc/5WY6-P7LF]; see also Pete Bigelow,
Chevy Corvette Is Latest Car Breached by Hackers, AUTOBLOG (Aug. 11, 2015, 7:20 PM),
http://www.autoblog.com/2015/08/11/chevy-corvette-car-hackers/ [http://perma.cc/W43EARPK]; Mrlanrat, Fast and Vulnerable, YOUTUBE (Aug. 11, 2015), https://www.you
tube.com/watch?v=-CH9BvFlrGs (employing a video demonstrating this type of cyberhack
of automobiles).
62 Bigelow, supra note 61.
63 Giulio Coraggio, Car Makers Join Forces for Connected Car Cyber Security,
TECHNOLOGY’S LEGAL EDGE (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.technologyslegaledge.com/2015/08/
27/car-makers-join-forces-for-connected-car-cyber-security/ [http://perma.cc/A48D-LK58].
64 Andrea Peterson, FBI Official: Companies Should Help Us ‘Prevent Encryption
Above All Else,’ WASH. POST (June 4, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2015/06/04/fbi-official-companies-should-help-us-prevent-encryption-above-allelse/ [http://perma.cc/5SCL-ECR8].
65 Id.
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that software engineers and coders use as access points to enter
otherwise secure software.66
But this FBI proposal arguably weakens cybersecurity67
because, for example, hackers could use the same back door as
the government, and the proposal conflicts with some existing
state law.68 Further, from a policy perspective, the proposal puts
legitimate privacy rights concerns at loggerheads with the
legitimate national security concerns described in this Part.
Moreover, as the CEO of Axeon, Inc., a company offering cyber
insurance, stated: “[N]o CISO wants to create a vulnerability for
him or herself by giving out the combination to the back door.”69
Another problem related to the government potentially acting
overzealously in its prosecution of cyberhacks is described in the
next sub-section.
7. Government and Third-Party Overreaching Responses to a
Cybersecurity Breach
The government’s and the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology’s (“MIT’s”) response to—and arguable cause of—the
suicide of twenty-six-year-old hacker Aaron Swartz, appears
disappointing.70 Swartz successfully hacked into MIT’s electronic
JSTOR academic database to make innocuous academic
information publicly available—actions seemingly fitting within
MIT’s own stated goals for “open education” and support for
“hackathons.”71 Yet, despite those goals, Swartz was relentlessly
pursued by MIT and government authorities, to the tune of
thirteen felony counts and at least fifty years in prison.72 These
acts by government attorneys and MIT ostensibly led Swartz to
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Id.
Id.
68 See, e.g., COMMONWEALTH OF MASS. OFFICE OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS & BUS.
REGULATION, A SMALL BUS. GUIDE: FORMULATING A COMPREHENSIVE WRITTEN INFO. SEC.
PROGRAM, http://www.mass.gov/ocabr/docs/idtheft/sec-plan-smallbiz-guide.pdf [http://perma.cc/
82KV-LL7E].
69 Christopher P. Skroupa, The Insurance Industry’s Vantage Point on Cyber Security,
FORBES (July 9, 2015, 5:42 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherskroupa/2015/07/
09/the-insurance-industrys-unique-vantage-point-on-cyber-security/#530e2a1a7f9d (CISO
stands for Chief Information Security Officer).
70 Sam Gustin, Aaron Swartz’s Suicide Prompts MIT Soul-Searching, TIME (Jan. 14,
2013), http://business.time.com/2013/01/14/mit-orders-review-of-aaron-swartz-suicide-assoul-searching-begins/ [http://perma.cc/NPN9-U9F6]; see also Lawrence Lessig, Why They
Mattered: Aaron Swartz, POLITICO (Dec. 22, 2013), http://www.politico.com/magazine/
story/2013/12/aaron-swartz-obituary-101418 [http://perma.cc/X8NJ-CUTB].
71 Hackathon, RECLAIM OPEN LEARNING, http://open.media.mit.edu/hackathon/
[http://perma.cc/VV7K-9HEF].
72 Tim Cushing, US Government Ups Felony Count in JSTOR/Aaron Swartz Case
from Four to Thirteen, TECHDIRT (Sept. 18, 2012, 7:42 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/
articles/20120917/17393320412/us-government-ups-felony-count-jstoraaron-swartz-casefour-to-thirteen.shtml [http://perma.cc/4NQB-Q4M4].
66
67
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the point where Swartz believed that he could no longer live his
life. MIT’s appalling behavior regarding this cybersecurity
matter is telling, not only because the school prides itself on its
tradition of hacking and its alleged desire of “open learning,”73
but also because, according to tenured Harvard Law Professor
and law and technology expert, Lawrence Lessig, a friend of the
young Swartz, JSTOR declined to pursue any action against
Swartz and requested that the government drop its case against
Swartz.74
Swartz’s suicide led to MIT being hacked again by so-called
“hacktivists” known only as “Anonymous,”75 who are discussed
later in this Article.76 I hope that Swartz’s hacking legacy
remains an important part of big data and cybersecurity
discussions, particularly because he came from a university
famous for “hacking.” However, none of the charges brought
against Swartz would have prevented or stopped the events
described in this Article. Yet, what I am not observing in the
legal, business, or financial media is a rational discussion of the
real economic carnage—not the made-up kind that Professor
Lessig alleged occurred with Swartz77—that can occur from a
cybersecurity breach.
8. 401(k)s and Other Defined Contribution Plans,
Investment, and Savings Accounts
I accept that, frankly, the loss of some of my customer or
personally identifiable information in a data breach that occurs
at a retailer such as Target, is not hugely impactful to me. For
well over a decade, anyone could go online and purchase my
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73 See generally HackMIT 2015, HACKMIT, https://hackmit.org/ [http://perma.cc/
RKW8-655C] (discussing MIT’s largest Hackathon); MIT HACKING MEDICINE,
http://hackingmedicine.mit.edu/ [http://perma.cc/BC6C-X8C2] (stating “[w]hy we should
all hack medicine”).
74 See Gustin, supra note 70; Lawrence Lessig, Prosecutor as Bully, LESSIG BLOG V2,
http://lessig.tumblr.com/post/40347463044/prosecutor-as-bully [http://perma.cc/GQ6C-AB
UT]; Juan Carlos Perez, Hactivist, Internet Innovator Aaron Swartz Commits Suicide,
PCWORLD (Jan. 12, 2013, 4:47 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2025165/hactivistinternet-innovator-aaron-swartz-commits-suicide.html [http://perma.cc/Z7AP-LJ7T]
(indicating Professor Lessig’s friendship with Swartz).
75 For more regarding the group Anonymous and hacking, see Gustin, supra note 70
and accompanying text.
76 Anonymous Hactivists Target MIT’s Websites over Aaron Swartz Suicide,
TELEGRAPH (Jan. 14, 2013, 11:45 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/980
0257/Anonymous-hacktivists-target-MIT-websites-over-Aaron-Swartz-suicide.html [http://
perma.cc/RNT2-493Q].
77 See Lessig, supra note 74 (“[A]nyone who says that there is money to be made in a
stash of ACADEMIC ARTICLES is either an idiot or a liar. It was clear what this was
not, yet our government continued to push as if it had caught the 9/11 terrorists
red-handed. Aaron had literally done nothing in his life ‘to make money.’”) (emphasis in
original).
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78 Jacob Pramuk, Scottrade Data Breach Affects up to 4M Customers,” CNBC
(Oct. 2, 2015, 2:57 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/10/02/Scottrade-data-breach-affectsup-to-4m-customers.html [http://perma.cc/PR38-QKX3].
79 VERIZON, supra note 9, at 21.
80 See David C. Wheelock, Too Big to Fail: The Pros and Cons of Breaking up Big
Banks, REGIONAL ECONOMIST 10 (Oct. 2012), https://www.stlouisfed.org/~/media/Files/
PDFs/publications/pub_assets/pdf/re/2012/d/Too_Big_To_Fail.pdf [http://perma.cc/RD95XN3F] (indicating that JPMorgan Chase was the largest of the big banks); see also Halah
Touryalai, The World’s 29 Too Big to Fail Banks, JPMorgan at the Top, FORBES (Nov. 11,
2013, 4:27 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2013/11/11/the-worlds-29-toobig-to-fail-banks-jpmorgan-at-the-top/.
81 For the purposes of full disclosure and disclosing any potential conflicts of
interest, I was a JPMorganChase & Co. officer for more than a decade, and the entity is
an unsecured creditor of mine on a currently undrawn account.
82 See, e.g., FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., YOUR INSURED DEPOSITS (2014),
https://www.fdic.gov/deposit/deposits/brochures/Your%20Insured%20Deposits%20-%20
English.pdf [http://perma.cc/AFG3-SJ2W]; see also Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950,
Pub. L. No. 81-797, 64 Stat. 873 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2012)).
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social security number, residential address, telephone information,
and the like. I recognize that my financial liability for
unauthorized charges to my credit cards is fifty dollars. An
inconvenience, yes, but putting me on the verge of bankruptcy,
no. But an example of what may put people on the verge of
bankruptcy—or being forced to eat cat food in retirement—occurred
in October 2015, as Scottrade, a well-known discount securities
broker was hacked.78 Seemingly, only a matter of time exists
before one of the major 401(k) custodians or providers is hacked,
which could lead to unauthorized trading or funds disappearing
from accounts.
Despite 2014 data indicating that the financial services
sector permitted the least amount of malware events per week
(an average of 350 per week),79 in 2014, the largest of the “too big
to fail”80 banks, JPMorganChase & Co.,81 faced a cyber breach
that impacted over 70 million customers. Even if one believes
that a life savings stuffed in an account insured by a federal
agency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), is
safe, FDIC insurance applies to bank failures, not necessarily
cyberattacks, unless those attacks ultimately lead to a bank
failure in which the bank is placed in receivership by the FDIC.82
Therefore, the retirement and financial security of persons in the
United States is vulnerable to a myriad of unknown
cyberthreats, with unknown financial consequences, because of
unknown, unwritten, or outdated policies that are essentially
impossible to keep up with the rapid pace of technological
advancement as described by Moore’s Law. Simply because
trades were reversed on the day of the NYSE’s ostensible
software failure in July 2015, does not mean that the same result
would occur following the next cyber terror attack on the NYSE
or on a different securities market.
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II. WHAT DO THE ESTABLISHED PRIVATE SECTOR AND
GOVERNMENTAL FAILURES TO ADEQUATELY DEFEND AGAINST
CYBERCRIME AT THIS NASCENT STAGE MEAN FOR THE
ENTREPRENEUR?
This Article has so far demonstrated that, to date, the public
and private sectors have not thwarted material cyberattacks
against the United States and its established businesses. Yet,
e-commerce sales represented more than $3 trillion in 2013,83
and according to consulting firm McKinsey, from 2004–2009,
electronic transactions represented 15% of U.S. gross domestic
product (“GDP”) growth.84 To understand what cybersecurity
means for the entrepreneurial startup enterprise, however, one
must first understand the milieu in which larger, traditional, or
established businesses operate in their attempts to manage the
risk of cyberattacks. This Part begins by looking at data points of
what those established business do in hopes of preventing a
cyberattack, then moves to a discussion of several potential
solutions available to those businesses, and finally concludes
with identifying the issue unique to entrepreneurs that is not
practically available to startup enterprises in terms of risk
management, leaving a meaningful dilemma in an age when
small entrepreneurial enterprises often work to create many
mobile apps and Internet platforms.
A.
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83 E-stats 2013: Measuring the Electronic Economy, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (May 28,
2015), http://www.census.gov/econ/estats/e13-estats.pdf [http://perma.cc/XFP5-QN7H].
84 MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, MCKINSEY & CO., INTERNET MATTERS: THE NET’S
SWEEPING IMPACT ON GROWTH, JOBS, AND PROSPERITY 16 (May 2011),
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/high_tech_telecoms_internet/internet_matters.
85 Any meaningful discussion of natural person cyber protection generally resides
beyond this Article’s scope.
86 SYMANTEC, supra note 51, at 14.
87 See Renaissance Capital, US IPO Pricing Recap: CyberArk Software Pops 85% and
Year’s Second Largest IPO Trades up, NASDAQ (Sept. 28, 2014, 1:21 PM),
http://www.nasdaq.com/article/us-ipo-pricing-recap-cyberark-software-pops-85-and-yearssecond-largest-ipo-trades-up-cm396042 [http://perma.cc/C6SD-GDLK]. Israel’s CyberArk,
although a foreign company, had its initial public offering (“IPO”) on the United States’
NASDAQ as recently as 2013, and saw its share price more than triple from June 2014 to
June 2015. CyberArk—as a foreign cybersecurity company—does, however, raise the
issue of allowing foreign corporations to collaborate with the U.S. government on
cyberterrorism and cybersecurity and to what extent these collaborative efforts should go,
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How Larger and Established Businesses Manage Cyber Risk
Although established, large businesses have a plethora of
cybersecurity firms from whom the established businesses may
purchase defenses against cyberattacks or cyberterrorism,85
these businesses were the target of approximately 41% of
spear-phishing attacks.86 These options include offerings from
newer companies such as CyberArk,87 Palo Alto Networks,88
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FireEye,89 Rapid 7,90 or established companies such as IBM91 and
Cisco.92 Further, beyond cyber prevention and cyber clean-up
companies, established businesses generally have the ability to
obtain cybersecurity insurance.93 Arca, a prominent exchange
traded fund which holds stock of cybersecurity firms and trades
under the ticker symbol “HACK” on the NYSE, has performed
well relative to the broader markets since the ETF’s inception.94
Cybersecurity insurance, while new and rare in its current
form (it originated in the late-1990s in a different form because of
different technological capabilities),95 is expensive, potentially
because of the difficult nature of quantifying risks96 associated
with cybercrime and cyber terror and because few large insurers
offer the product.97 AIG predicts that the cyber-insurance market
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even with traditional U.S. allies.
88 See Palo Alto Networks, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) passim (Sept. 18, 2014).
89 See FireEye, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 6 (Mar. 3, 2015). FireEye, Inc.
advised on the famed 2013 Sony Breach. Basak, supra note 12, at 5.
90 See Rapid7, Inc., Amendment No. 1 to Form S-1 (Form S-1/A) 52 (June 26, 2015).
91 See, e.g., Cyber Security Solutions from IBM, IBM, http://www-304.ibm.com/
industries/publicsector/us/en/contentemplate1/!!/xmlid=148819 [http://perma.cc/UL58-7JUT]
(marketing IBM’s apparent “Cyber Security Solutions” and “Cyber Security Leadership”).
But see Alex Barinka, Five Charts Show Why IBM Is Worst Dow Stock for 2nd Year,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Dec. 30, 2014, 12:43 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2014-12-30/five-charts-show-why-ibm-is-worst-dow-performer-for-second-year
[http://perma.cc/J4RU-ZGQE]; Kevin Kingsbury, IBM Is One Week away from Infamy,
WALL ST. J.: MONEYBEAT (Dec. 24, 2014, 9:05 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/
2014/12/24/ibm-is-one-week-away-from-dow-infamy/ [http://perma.cc/G3T6-9HN8] (“IBM
is just a week away from some infamy—becoming the first Dow component to be bottom of
the barrel in consecutive years since now-departed Bethlehem Steel in 1995 and 1996.”);
Heard on the Street: IBM Biggest Dow Loser for Second Year, POST-BULLETIN (Dec. 31,
2014 4:38 PM), http://www.postbulletin.com/business/heard-on-the-street-ibm-biggestdow-loser-for-second/article_834834c4-fe05-588e-bf1f-ee577be4c90f.html [http://perma.cc/
SMM9-2F6J] (indicating collectively that IBM has been the worst performing Dow Jones
Industrial Average component company for two years in a row in 2013 and 2014, a feat
not accomplished since the mid-1990s, and IBM’s white papers on information technology
on IBM’s website are typically from the decade ending 2010, with only one white paper in
the past three years).
92 See, e.g., Cybersecurity, CISCO, http://www.cisco.com/web/strategy/government/
defense_cybersecurity.html [http://perma.cc/4PUG-RXDM] (indicating various industryspecific cybersecurity solutions).
93 Basak, supra note 12, at 2.
94 PureFunds ISE Cyber Security ETF, Supplement to the Prospectus dated Nov. 7,
2014 and Statement of Additional Information (“SAI”) dated November 7, 2014, as
supplemented March 24, 2015 (Form 497) (June 18, 2015).
95 Basak, supra note 12, at 3.
96 Id. (“Most firms are reluctant to offer policies for property damage resulting from
hacking because there’s almost no data available to determine costs . . . . Insurers have
been excluding infrastructure damage caused by cyber-attacks from standard property
and general liability policies, said Kevin Kalinich, who leads the cyber-risk team at
insurance broker Aon Plc.”).
97 Id. (indicating that, for example, Zurich Insurance Group, AG and Munich Re are
considering offering these products but do not offer the product currently).
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as of 2015 is $2 billion in annual premiums but could be $10
billion in annual premiums by 2020.98
Currently, coverage limits through AIG are at $100 million
each for both property damage and bodily injury caused by a
cyberattack.99 Even if an established business were to pay the
premiums for a cyber-insurance policy, these policies do not cover
certain important cybersecurity matters, because of a lack of data
on risk and cost.100 To contextualize this lack of actuarial data,
insurers currently have fewer than twenty years of data points
from which to develop cyber-insurance policies, in comparison to
up to one hundred years of data points from which to develop and
tweak more typical property or liability insurance.101
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Id.
Id.
Id.; see also Cyber Risk Assessments, KROLL, http://www.kroll.com/en-us/cybersecurity/data-breach-prevention/cyber-risk-assessments [http://perma.cc/T76A-6NEH]
(describing assessing risk from well-known security-in-many-industries-firm, Kroll).
101 Basak, supra note 12, at 4.
102 See, e.g., DAVID FEINLEIB, WHY STARTUPS FAIL: AND HOW YOURS CAN SUCCEED 33
(2012).
103 See, e.g., EMERGING COMPANIES GUIDE, A RESOURCE FOR PROFESSIONALS AND
ENTREPRENEURS 202–04 (Robert L. Brown & Alan S. Gutterman eds., 2d ed. 2004).
104 SYMANTEC, supra note 51, at 14.
105 Id. at 70 (indicating spear phishing of small businesses represented 18% of attacks
in 2011 but 34% by 2014).
106 Strengthening Cybersecurity, JEB!2016 (Sept. 14, 2015), https://jeb2016.com/
strengthening-cybersecurity/?lang=en [http://perma.cc/BF7G-G3FZ] (emphasis added).
98
99
100
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B. The Financial Elephant in the Room: The Entrepreneurial Cost
Unlike established businesses, entrepreneurial startups are
constantly concerned with so-called “runway” (the amount of
time the company has before running out of cash),102 burn rates
(how quickly the company spends its cash),103 and attracting new
financial capital to allow the business to continue operating (one
can think of this scenario as new equity investment equaling
revenue for the entrepreneurial startup, often employing only a
few people, typically at below-market cash consideration in
return for equity stakes in the startup that have unlimited
upside at the point of a successful exit, such as an acquisition or
an IPO). And in 2014, small businesses were the target of 34% of
spear-phishing attacks, only seven percentage points below those
of large businesses,104 an increase of more than 88% from 2011
levels.105 Furthermore, according to the website of 2016 presidential
candidate, former Florida Governor Jeb Bush, in 2014 “60% of all
targeted attacks struck small and medium-sized organizations,
which often have fewer resources to invest in cybersecurity.”106
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This Article does not intend to convey that startups lack
access to the choices available to established business discussed
in Section II.A. Rather, startups often are unable to devote the
financial resources necessary to these products because of
runway, burn-rate, the pacing and amounts of attracting
additional financial capital available to the enterprise, and the
unknown costs associated with cybersecurity risk management.107
The cost of complying with existing and proposed laws,
regulations, and orders discussed in Part III is simply impossible
for many entrepreneurial startups, whether due to the founders’
ignorance of the governing rules or the inability to afford
cyberthreat risk compliance, either financially or in terms of
focus on growing the business.
As a result, a question exists for the reader throughout Part
III, which is, “should entrepreneurial startups be faced with
complying with the same regime as established corporations as
described in Section II.A?”

C M
Y K

05/09/2016 12:16:02

107 See VERIZON, supra note 9, at 27–28 (“When budgeting and operating an InfoSec
[information security] program, accurately assessing . . . how much it’ll cost [is] critically
important. A lack of reliable estimates leads to a creative environment for decision
making, where underspending, overspending, and useless spending invariably result.”).
Verizon estimated that the average financial loss from a cyber breach per 1000 records
was between $52,000 and $87,000. Given that many angel investors typically provide
startup capital to entrepreneurs in chunks of approximately $25,000–$50,000, seed-stage
investment can be eliminated by a cyber breach, without even discussing the cost of cyber
risk management. Even the predicted cost of only 100 records is over $25,000. Id.
108 Remarks by the President at the Federal Trade Commission, WHITE HOUSE
(Jan. 12, 2015, 12:15 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/12/remarkspresident-federal-trade-commission [http://perma.cc/GZT6-RZHQ]; see also Tau & Dwoskin,
supra note 53 (“The proposals came amid the revelation the U.S. Central Command
Twitter and YouTube accounts appeared to have been [hacked by Islamic militants],
underscoring cybersecurity challenges the U.S. faces. The tweets posted by the hackers
purportedly included phone numbers of top military commanders and claimed to provide
military scenarios for a [potential] conflict with North Korea and China.”).
109 Foreign Policy Cyber Security, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
issues/foreign-policy/cybersecurity [http://perma.cc/9JM4-NQ2M].
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III. FEDERAL LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION
In early 2015, President Obama stated: “[I]n this dizzying age
of technology and innovation . . . cyber-criminals . . . can . . . [t]urn
your life upside down. It may take you months to get your
finances back in order. . . . So this is a direct threat to the
economic security of American families and we’ve got to stop
it.”108 Elsewhere, President Obama indicated: “Our critical
infrastructure continues to be at risk from threats in cyberspace,
and our economy is harmed by the theft of our intellectual
property.”109 Understanding some of what the government has
proposed and already put in place is also necessary to
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appreciating the entrepreneurial startup’s perspective in terms of
cybersecurity and cyberterrorism protection efforts. This Part
describes several of those measures, including proposed and
existing legislation and recent comments from regulatory
agencies.
A.

B.

SEC and FINRA
From a business perspective, perhaps the next most relevant
guidance comes from the Securities and Exchange Commission
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Remarks by the President at the Federal Trade Commission, supra note 108.
Remarks by the President at the National Cybersecurity Communications
Integration Center, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 13, 2015, 3:10 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2015/01/13/remarks-president-national-cybersecurity-communicationsintegration-cent [http://perma.cc/XP7B-326J].
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Executive Order -- Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, WHITE HOUSE
(Jan. 12, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/executive-orderimproving-critical-infrastructure-cybersecurity [http://perma.cc/U2YE-RD6B].
115 Foreign Policy Cyber Security, supra note 109.
110
111
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Proposed Legislation
Timed to coincide with the comments quoted in this Part’s
opening paragraph, at a speech delivered at the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”), the Obama administration indicated that it
would be introducing legislation of varying sorts with the hope of
protecting consumers from cyberattacks.110 These proposals
generally aimed at protecting privacy, preventing identity theft,
and helping children remain safe in cyberspace. The following
day, the President announced additional proposals at DHS.111
There, President Obama discussed how the federal
government could “work with the private sector to better protect
American companies against cyber threats.”112 The President
further indicated: “Foreign governments, criminals and hackers
probe America’s computer networks every single day. We saw
that again with the attack at Sony, which actually destroyed data
and computer hardware that is going to be very costly for that
company to clean up.”113
These proposals were added to the President’s 2013
Executive Order 13636, which—issued exactly two years to the
week before the 2015 proposals—concerned cyberthreats,
including cyberterrorist threats, to the nation’s infrastructure.114
Yet, as of October 2015, the cybersecurity web page at
whitehouse.gov had no updates—text or video—since May 1, 2015,
well before the numerous cyberattacks described earlier in this
Article.115
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(“SEC”) and Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”).
In 2014, the SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and
Examinations (“OCIE”) examined approximately fifty broker-dealers
(“B/Ds”) and fifty registered investment advisers (“RIAs”).116 OCIE’s
ultimate report indicated that a majority of B/Ds and RIAs
examined maintained written information security policies
(“WISPs”), nearly half of those firms examined identified industry
cybersecurity practices via peer groups or information sharing,
and more than 90% of B/Ds and RIAs employed some sort of
encryption. These data points resulted from participating firms
answering questionnaires, not from any inspection or testing by
OCIE or a designated third-party to act on OCIE’s behalf.117
FINRA’s report described what the organization not only
viewed as the material cybersecurity risks facing B/Ds but also
believed were appropriate risk mitigation tactics, including
references to the NIST framework.118 The report identified risk
assessment and oversight of third-party vendors (“vendor
management”), consultants, and others, as a material concern for
B/Ds.119 Currently, however, neither B/Ds nor RIAs are under
any SEC requirement to maintain cyberthreat insurance or have
written policies regarding customer losses in the event of a cyber
breach.
C.
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116 Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, U.S. Securities & Exchange
Commission, Cybersecurity Examination Sweep Summary, 4 NAT’L EXAM PROGRAM RISK
ALERT (Feb. 3, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/cybersecurity-examinationsweep-summary.pdf [http://perma.cc/BKM8-BF6Q].
117 Anthony Zeoli, Lock It up: SEC & FINRA Weigh in on Cybersecurity Issues (Feb.
23, 2015, 10:09 PM), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2015/02/63237-lock-it-up-sec-finraweigh-in-on-cybersecurity-issues/ [http://perma.cc/A4MT-UKJE].
118 FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., REPORT ON CYBERSECURITY PRACTICES 42–43
(2015). For more on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), see
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, www.nist.gov [http://perma.cc/
E8HW-YKXR].
119 FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., supra note 118.
120 Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C.
§§ 441–444 (2012) [hereinafter SAFETY Act].
121 After Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), if
corporations are persons, then the word that attaches to describe corporations is “who,”
not “that.”
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The SAFETY Act
The so-called “Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective
Technologies Act of 2002” (“SAFETY Act”)120 provides, in essence,
a shield for certain businesses from tort liability. Specifically, the
SAFETY Act provides a safe harbor—in the form of an
indemnity—to cybersecurity businesses that fail in their
essential function of providing cybersecurity.121 While this Article
focuses on the indemnity provision, as authors Finch and Spiegel
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122 Brian E. Finch & Leslie H. Spiegel, Litigation Following a Cyber Attack: Possible
Outcomes and Mitigation Strategies Utilizing the Safety Act, 30 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH.
L.J. 349, 351 (2014).
123 SAFETY Act, 6 U.S.C. §§ 441–444 (detailing QATT).
124 Id. § 442.
125 Finch & Spiegel, supra note 122, at 369 (referencing the regulations implementing
the SAFETY Act of 2002, 71 Fed. Reg. 33147, 33150 (June 8, 2006) (codified in 6 C.F.R.
pt. 25)); see also 6 U.S.C. § 444(2)(b).
126 The SAFETY Act states:
There shall exist a Federal cause of action for claims arising out of, relating
to, or resulting from an act of terrorism when qualified anti-terrorism
technologies have been deployed in defense against or response or recovery
from such act and such claims result or may result in loss to the
Seller. . . . Such Federal cause of action shall be brought only for claims for
injuries that are proximately caused by sellers that provide qualified
anti-terrorism technology to Federal and non-Federal government customers.
6 U.S.C. § 442(a)(1) (2012).
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asserted: “These liability protections can take the form of
jurisdictional defenses, a cap on liability, or a presumption of
immediate dismissal of third-party liability claims.”122
In addition, the SAFETY Act permits the federal government
to give a seal of approval to certain entities (very similar to the
FTC’s COPPA compliance seal, despite negotiable prices and
hacks that occurred and despite Target having been COPPA
compliant). These entities receive a certification as a “Qualified
Anti-Terrorism Technology” or “QATT.”123 The SAFETY Act
mandates that all cyberterrorism-related liability claims must be
litigated in federal court; punitive damages and pre-judgment
interest awards are barred; and compensatory damages are
capped at an amount agreed to by both the government and
company, with the damage cap equal to a set amount of
insurance the company must possess. Further, damages awarded
to plaintiffs will be offset by any collateral recoveries they receive
(e.g., victim compensation funds, life insurance, etc.).124
As Finch and Spiegel asserted: “The only way this
presumption of immunity can be overcome is to demonstrate that
the application contained information that was submitted
through fraud or willful misconduct.”125 Cyberattacks are
governed by the SAFETY Act’s definition of “terrorism,”
regardless of the type of product or service in which the business
is engaged (i.e., the business does not have to be in the
technology space for these protections to apply). However, any
client who purchases QATT-approved software from a certified
QATT seller is absolved from any liability, so long as an act of
terrorism is declared by the Secretary of Homeland Security.126
Simply put, the seller of the QATT is the sole look-to for
liability, and the DHS painstakingly articulated this fact when
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promulgating the final rule implementing the SAFETY Act.127
Practically, the SAFETY Act supersedes the existing bankruptcy
system and replaces an entire body of law with an explicit
government grant to internalize arguably nominal costs for large
businesses who can afford to purchase QATT-approved software,
raising the question of whether entrepreneurial startups are able
to purchase QATT-approved software, and externalizing the
tremendous damage that could occur should a cyber-terror attack
happen to a given safe-harbored business.
D. Discussion of Policy Prescriptions Generally
Typically, a law journal article identifies a problem and then
attempts to propose a unique solution underpinned by a proposed
law, rule, regulation, executive order or the like. However, as Scott
Kannry, the CEO of Aon Global in the insurance industry—the
holder of both a J.D. and M.B.A.—has stated:
[Saying that the cybersecurity industry is] [f]ailing isn’t the right
description, although one could easily come to that conclusion given
the trend line on events over the past 12 months. I would characterize
the industry as one that needs a better approach. To date, most of the
focus has been on solutions –firewalls, encryption, antivirus, you
name it. The problem is that a cyber security program consists of
dozens, if not hundreds of technologies, policies and procedures, none
of which is a silver bullet and any of which can be immediately
outdated based on the ever evolving risk climate. Imagine if your job
was solely focused on putting together a puzzle, but some pieces were
missing, others didn’t fit together, and every 30 minutes the board
changed. Technically, you would fail, but you never really stood a
chance!128
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127 Regulations Implementing the Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective
Technologies (SAFETY) Act of 2002, 71 Fed. Reg. at 33150–51 (“Congress balanced the
need to provide recovery to plaintiffs against the need to ensure adequate deployment
of anti-terrorism technologies by creating a cause of action that provides a certain
level of recovery against Sellers, while at the same time protecting others in the
supply chain.”); see also 6 C.F.R. § 25.7(d) (2016) (“There shall exist only one cause of
action for loss of property, personal injury, or death for performance or
non-performance of the Seller’s Qualified Anti-Terrorism Technology in relation to an
Act of Terrorism. Such cause of action may be brought only against the Seller of the
Qualified Anti-Terrorism Technology and may not be brought against the buyers, the
buyers’ contractors, or downstream users of the Technology, the Seller’s suppliers or
contractors, or any other person or entity.”).
128 Christopher P. Skroupa, The Insurance Industry’s Unique Vantage Point on Cyber
Security, FORBES (July 9, 2015, 5:42 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherskroupa/
2015/07/09/the-insurance-industrys-unique-vantage-point-on-cyber-security/.
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As a result, current cybersecurity policies appear too lax; the
question is how the public and private sector should procedurally
and substantively build an effective framework.
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129 Air Force Tech. Sgt. Jake Richmond, Obama Unveils Next Steps in Cybersecurity
Plan, U.S. DEP’T DEF. (Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article
/603919 [http://perma.cc/SXL2-9DR6].
130 Cyberplanner, F ED . C OMM . C OMMISSION , https://www.fcc.gov/cyberplanner
[http://perma.cc/GRD5-7BYL].
131 See Harsha, supra note 2.
132 Cyberplanner, supra note 130.
133 Id.
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IV. EVIDENCE THAT A PUBLIC-PRIVATE OR PRIVATE MARKET
ALTERNATIVE EXISTS
In his January 2015 remarks to DHS, President Obama
indicated that “[n]either government, nor the private sector can
defend the nation alone. It’s going to have to be a shared
mission—government and industry working hand-in-hand as
partners.”129 This Part explores that option, with an eye toward
the entrepreneurial startup.
Yet, as this Article indicated above, many of the available
cyber-protection solutions—whether software or insurance,
regardless of not only the size of the enterprise offering the cyber
protection but also the QATT-approval safe harbor
involvement—are simply too expensive for entrepreneurial startups
concerned with burn rate, runway, and continuing capital raises
while protecting against founder and insider equity dilution.
For example, the sole government resource that appears to
exist for small businesses, of which entrepreneurial startups are
a flavor, is the Federal Communication Commission’s (“FCC’s”)
“Small Biz Cyber Planner 2.0.”130 And version 2.0 was launched
three years ago in October 2012, which, going back to Moore’s
Law,131 likely means that the Cyber Planner is out of date,
despite the FCC’s stated goal of providing “an online resource to
help small businesses create customized cybersecurity plans.”132
“As larger companies take steps to secure their systems, less
secure small businesses are easier targets for cyber criminals.”133
The planner itself is a fifty-one page booklet (also
customizable for a business on the FCC’s website, but all
information comes directly from the booklet) that includes
sections such as (1) inventory your data; (2) keep a record of the
data’s location, and move the record to more appropriate places
when needed; (3) develop a privacy policy; (4) protect data
collected on the Internet (stating “you need to make sure any
data collected through your website and stored by the third party
is sufficiently secure,” as if that level of due diligence is
necessarily feasible); (5) create layers of security; (6) plan for
data loss or theft (threateningly stating “[n]ot only can the loss or
theft of data hurt your business, brand and customer confidence,

37838-chp_19-2 Sheet No. 29 Side A

05/09/2016 12:16:02

Do Not Delete

2016]

4/23/16 10:17 AM

Moore’s Law Versus “Man’s” Law?

397

it can also expose you to the often-costly state and federal
regulations that cover data protection and privacy. Data loss can
also expose businesses to significant litigation risk”).134 Whether
entrepreneurs even have the time to read this material is
questionable, given that founders must essentially dedicate all of
their waking hours to their fledgling businesses. The FCC also
provides arguably meaningful guidance to protect mobile wallets,
which employ software downloaded to a mobile device to pay for
commercial transactions or person-to-person payments.135 The
advice provided in this booklet is of questionable value in
functioning as a cyber safeguard.
As a result, entrepreneurial startups face unique challenges
when faced with defending their firms from hackers,
cybercriminals, cyberterrorists, and others attempting to
successfully breach data, big data, or systems, via the Internet or
the Internet of Things, negatively affecting the startups,
including to the point of the startups’ very existences. Part V
advances some initial proposals for further discussion and
evaluation that would assist the entrepreneurial startup when
dealing with the very real threats that face entrepreneurs.
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134 Cyber Security Planning Guide, FED. COMM. COMMISSION PDS-1–PDS-5,
https://transition.fcc.gov/cyber/cyberplanner.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZW8V-4PAQ]; see also
FCC Smartphone Security Checker, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, https://www.fcc.gov/smart
phone-security [http://perma.cc/T8CW-Y6AQ] (last updated Oct. 30, 2015, 12:45 PM).
135 Mobile Wallet Services Protection, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, https://www.fcc.gov/
guides/mobile-wallet-services-protection [http://perma.cc/T7F6-FCY5] (last updated Nov.
4, 2015, 12:00 AM).
136 See Basak, supra note 12.
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V. PROPOSED INITIAL DISCUSSION POINTS FOR ENTREPRENEURIAL
SUCCESS FACING CYBERTHREATS
This Part asserts several proposals that may be both cost
efficient and effective for the startup and effective for the
startup’s consumer base. First, communication and cooperation
between the public and private sector are important.136 Having
said that, much of corporate law—beyond securities regulation,
taxation, consumer protection, and immigrant worker visas—
concerning entrepreneurial startups resides at the state level.
From entity formation to the applicable internal affairs doctrine
affecting the startup, to terms of use for many apps and web
platforms, the end-user must agree to specific state law for
applicable law, jurisdiction, and forum. Because of state law’s
importance, the proposals in this Part reflect suggestions for
state-level changes to corporate codes, rather than action on the
part of federal agencies.
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A.

Corporate Governance
Ultimately, corporations are governed by a board of directors.137
Corporate boards have fiduciary duties of care (unless
exculpated) and loyalty to the company and shareholders.138 One
proposal is that a part of the duty of care that cannot be
exculpated is that each corporation must create a functioning
risk management committee, under whose umbrella falls
cybersecurity. For public companies, the SEC could take the
position that, similar to the Sarbanes-Oxley-mandated
requirement of an audit committee expert serving on the audit
committee, an IT or risk management expert serve on that
committee. I would prefer to see such requirements come from
the state-level so that businesses can choose what governance
framework works best for them among a variety of cybersecurity
fiduciary risk management options. For entrepreneurial startups
advised appropriately, the fear of personal liability for breaching
the fiduciary of care should be sufficient incentive to create a
risk-management committee, without the added need and cost of
an IT expert serving on the committee. People tend to respond to
incentives, and the incentive of facing unlimited personal
liability for a fiduciary duty breach should encourage many
entrepreneurial startups to create a risk-management committee.
B.
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137 A discussion of LLCs or the array of other owner-liability-shielded entities is
beyond the scope of this Article.
138 See generally D. GORDON SMITH & CYNTHIA A. WILLIAMS, BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS (2d ed. 2004).
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Sliding Scales for Size
To avoid disincentivizing entrepreneurial startups from
forming while balancing the need to operate in a riskless
manner, a sliding scale for liability could exist. This Article
stipulates that little to no logical reason exists for many arbitrary
numbers that laws and regulations use relative to requirements
and exemptions for corporations, based on either financial or
employee pool size. Having said that, this Article does advance
that appropriately tailored safe harbors from liability should
exist for businesses with an equity capitalization under an
inflation-adjusted amount of, hypothetically, $100 million, those
entities with fewer than, somewhere near twenty employees, and
newly formed entities fewer than approximately thirteen months
in age that are non-affiliates of previously existing enterprises.
With the rapid pace that entrepreneurial startups must
deploy capital for research and development, alpha testing, beta
testing, a focus on obtaining additional capital from angel or
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venture capital investors (or both), seed stage companies often
lack the time and human and financial capital to employ
attorneys to advise them of the need for cyber-risk assessments.
This Article does not believe that it is effective policy to kill off
fledgling businesses that are cyberhacked, because those
companies simply lacked the knowledge, the resources, or the
time because of their nascent nature. As the businesses grow in
size, time of existence, and financial capital, then sliding scales of
obligations should begin to fall on the entrepreneurial ventures.
These matters could be self-regulating, for example, by the
Venture Capital Association of America or other similar groups
affecting the startup ecosystem. What fund manager would want
to deploy venture or seed-stage capital to an enterprise that was
naked in the face of cyber risk? Couple this self-regulation with
tweaking of existing state statutes on fiduciary duties that would
require an organization to face risk management of cybersecurity
in its evaluation of fiduciary duty exculpation at entity
formation, and the private sector can self-regulate for
entrepreneurs.
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CONCLUSION
In mid-October 2015 at the first Democratic Party
presidential debate, moderator Anderson Cooper asked: “[w]hat
is the greatest national security threat to the United States?”
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Protecting startups should not, however, come at the
expense of consumers. As a result, affordable and meaningful
cyber insurance could be required by states. A need for this
insurance exists, as articulated earlier in this Article, but costs
are high and insurers lack the actuarial data that they need.
State-level, or if absolutely necessary, federal level, cyber-terror
or cyberthreat insurance could be mandated and overseen by a
government insurance agency, such as the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) or Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (“PBGC”). While, for example, the PBGC has
protected the pensions of millions of Americans since the entities
formation under ERISA in the mid-1970s, PBGC is funded by the
companies whose pension plans it insures, rather than the
taxpaying public, and claimants are paid based on a sliding scale
based on financial capital. A similar framework may work well in
the case of protecting customers of startup enterprises from
financial loss, and the insurance and administration of the
insurance may be at a lower cost than currently exists in the
marketplace.
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Out of five candidates—among whom were four senators, two
governors, a former secretary of state, and a former secretary of
the Navy—only one candidate, attorney, former Navy secretary,
and Senator Jim Webb, responded with “cyberthreats.” Webb
indicated: “Our greatest day-to-day threat is cyber warfare
against this country.”139
Regardless of whether former Senator Webb is correct in his
assessment of the single greatest security threat to the United
States, cyber terror and cybersecurity are legitimate emerging
threats to this nation. And in the face of those threats, this
Article has proposed problems and policy solutions specific to
protecting this country’s citizenry from cyberattacks on
businesses, with an emphasis on the specific challenges faced by
entrepreneurial startups in that effort that are far different than
the challenges faced by established businesses in the hopes of
spurring a dialogue at this Symposium that both protects the
U.S. populace and remains supportive of ensuring an
environment supportive of entrepreneurial startups from
ideation to commercialization.
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139 CNN Democratic Debate – Full Transcript, CNN (Oct. 13, 2015, 11:26 PM),
http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2015/10/13/cnn-democratic-debate-full-transcript/ [http://
perma.cc/66UV-EN6J].

